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Abstract. The damage caused by the 2011 Christchurch earthquake has led to the 
introduction of compulsory seismic strengthening legislation for all unreinforced 
earthquake-prone masonry buildings (URM) within New Zealand. The legislation, 
passed in 2013, requires all such URM commercial, multi-unit and multi-storey 
residential buildings to be upgraded and strengthened to a minimum of 34% or more of 
the New Building Standard, irrespective of the earthquake zone within which they are 
located. Buildings so designated and in high earthquake zones will have a very limited 
time bring their buildings into line with these requirements. The proposal particularly 
affects old URM buildings. Some of these are buildings have a declared heritage value, 
many do not.  Most were built around the turn of the twentieth
 
Century. Together they 
make up a considerable portion of many small town commercial precincts. The 
legislation affects all parts of New Zealand, regardless of the particular region’s 
exposure to earthquake risk.  
The paper will background the current legislation, compare international legislation and 
study the financial effects of the legislation, case studying  buildings within two distinct 
seismic zones. The findings suggest that where the cost of the upgrade puts the viability 
of the building as a rental investment at risk, the owner will most likely adopt 
demolition is the only feasible outcome. This could have far-reaching implications for 
the wellbeing of many small towns within New Zealand. An alternative strategy is 
examined and assessed.  
1. Introduction  
Seismic retrofitting of existing buildings remains a complex and often politically difficult area for 
governmental authorities. Issues of heritage, construction complexity, social upheaval and financial 
considerations including loss of rental income, can put the building owner to considerable disadvantage 
and threaten the commercial viability of any retrofit project. This disruption has to be balanced against 
the advantages of the nation’s building stock becoming more resistant to earthquake damage, and hence 
providing a safer social environment for its citizens.  
A OECD report, commissioned in 2006, states poor seismic retrofit solutions often arise from a lack 
of shared responsibility between local and national municipalities. There are  also, in many examples,  
a lack of  incentives that will convince owners to carry out the work [1]. Hassler (2009) suggests historic 
buildings will always be at risk because modern land-use regulations “regularly lead to 
considerable losses of historic substance in areas close to historic city centres because potential 
financial returns on future use are compared with the proceeds of a change of use of existing 
buildings.”[2] Spence suggests a lack of financial incentive is also an issue. The cost of seismic retrofit 
varies from 5-50% of the total rebuilding cost and, according to Spence, with the return period of major 
earthquakes one hundred years or more, there is “...small incentive for the building owner to make the 
investment worthwhile” [3]. Other researchers, such as Fardis, agree the major threat to human life 
comes from existing (and hence older) buildings. In spite of this, Fardis suggests that new construction 
continues to remain foremost in the minds of legislators researching earthquake engineering and in the 
formulation of building codes. The redesign of an existing building to strengthen earthquake resistance 
is a significantly more demanding and technically complex activity than the design of a new structure. 
History, culture, heritage and building activity all combine to influence the hearts and minds of the 
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designers. Cost also is a significant issue. Limitation in funding inevitably mean “..the vast majority of 
the building inventory in seismic regions worldwide is [and remains], by and large, substandard and 
seismically deficient in the light of our current knowledge” [4]. Social considerations operate as well, 
suggest Wilkinson et al. Many building owners have a belief that spending money on seismic 
strengthening would be money better spent elsewhere, and hence have a subdued enthusiasm to part 
with the necessary funds required to make their buildings seismically safer [5]. 
2.  New Zealand’s earthquake legislation 
The Building (Earthquake-prone Buildings) Amendment Bill 2013 was introduced into the New 
Zealand Parliament on 13th December 2013. The intent was to upgrade and improve methods of 
managing New Zealand’s older and often earthquake-prone buildings. The legislation arose out of the 
recommendations of the Canterbury Earthquake Royal Commission, [6] a body formed to look at the 
reasons for the collapsed buildings following the two earthquakes that struck Christchurch city over a 
six-month period. An earthquake of magnitude 7.1 struck on September 4th 2010. This was followed by 
another earthquake on the 11th February 2011, this time of magnitude 6.3. The latter earthquake caused 
extensive damage across the city and caused the deaths of 185 people. Included in the damage were 
many small, URM retail buildings commonly referred to as “home shop” or “house shop” buildings, 
the main focus of this paper (Fig 1). This building typology, so called because the shop owners retailed 
their wares on the ground floor and lived with their families in the upstairs portion of the predominantly 
two-storey building, formed the core of the many urban streetscape settlements that grew up around the 
larger cities in New Zealand, mostly between the years 1880+ to the 1920-1930s. In Auckland for 
example, such centres as Grey Lynn, Ponsonby, Herne Bay, parts of Dominion Rd, Mt Eden, Papakura 
and old established areas such as Otahuhu all have URM “home shop” buildings as an integral part of 
the retail streetscape. Other centres are similar. In regional towns further south, such as Wanganui or 
Marton (one of the case study focuses of this paper), as much as 50% of the streetscape are UBM 
buildings of varying heritage or non-heritage quality. External construction was single, double or of 
cavity brick construction, often with protruding parapets elaborately adorned. Floors were constructed 
of timber, with strip timber tongue and groove flooring. Access to the upper floor, where the owner and 
family lived, was usually by internal stairway (Fig 2). 
Figure 1 Grey Lynn Auckland (Source: C Murphy) 
 
 
Figure 2 Ponsonby Rd Auckland (Source: C Murphy) 
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2.1 Criticisms of past earthquake policy 
Whilst the previous act required Local Authorities to develop policies around earthquake-prone 
buildings, there was, according to the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment (MBIE) 
Consultation Document, large discretion in the  system as to “how actively they identify and deal 
with these buildings.” 
Individual local authorities have very different approaches to implementing current policy 
requirements. Some local authorities are not actively identifying earthquake-prone buildings or 
requiring building owners to deal with them. Other authorities have taken some action, but have 
given building owners very long timeframes to resolve problems. A number of authorities have 
taken strong action, including requiring higher strengthening than required by law. [7,16] 
The MBIE suggested some 15000-25000 buildings fell into the earthquake-prone category but 
acknowledged this figure was a very broad estimate as only a few local authorities “can provide 
good data”. [7,6] 
Of the 66 local authorities, only 23 were able to provide any information on the number of 
earthquake- prone buildings in their districts, and much of the information received was 
incomplete. [7,12] 
2.2 Risk Analysis and Time frames 
The proposed legislation originally treated the whole of NZ as a uniform risk, with the upgrading 
of URM earthquake-prone buildings required within a specified time frame (15 years) applied 
uniformly across the whole of New Zealand. This stance has since been changed, with the MBIE 
document acknowledging the original proposal had met considerable resistance from submitters. 
Submissions from the Auckland Council, the largest Territorial Authority in New Zealand, help to 
change this stance. They were based on a risk analysis survey from GIS Science, a research 
consultancy commissioned by the Auckland Council, which looked at the statistical probability of 
a significant earthquake and the likely costs, number of collapses, and number of deaths that could 
result. [8] 
GIS Science suggested the risk levels to life from an earthquake were for Auckland statistically 
very low, even for earthquakes with a return period of 500 years or more (0.002 annual probability), 
with the number of deaths in the Region from this return period estimated as 7, with 2 deaths within 
Auckland city itself. Auckland, the location of many URM buildings has, suggests the GIS report, 
rarely experienced even low-level earthquake shaking “since Europeans first settled there in the 
early 1800s and there appear to be no historical earthquake casualties”. The Modified Mercalli 
intensity (MMI), an indication of earthquake intensity, has never been exceeded in excess of MM6, 
with only occasionally localized intensities of MM4 and MM5 shaking, and one instance only of 
MM6 shaking in 1891 (the Waikato Heads earthquake), located some 50 km south of Auckland 
near the mouth of the Waikato river. [8] 
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As it stands, the legislation now acknowledges different time frames for different zones, and the 
timeframes for assessment and strengthening varying between 15 and 35 years, depending upon 
the risk zone. 
2.3.  Barriers to revitalization and enhancement of URM buildings  
2.3.1.  Excessive strengthening requirements 
Whilst the time allowances for upgrade have been eased, the requirement for URM and other 
earthquake prone buildings to be ungraded to a minimum of 34% of the NBS remains, regardless 
of the location of the building. This effectively means, suggest researchers such as Tailrisk 
Economics, the safety standard for a building in Auckland (a low risk earthquake area) is about 
“three thousand times stronger than the one applied in Wellington (a high risk area) [9]. What is 
more, suggests the Tailgate report, compliance with the minimum standard for Auckland will result 
in a cost in excess of three billion dollars, (Tailgate’s own report puts it as high as $10 billion) “but 
is expected to take 4,000 years to save a single life” [9]. The report suggest that the definition of 
what constitutes an “earthquake-prone” building should be urgently revisited and based on 
evidence of risk and not graded according “to their estimated strength relative to the new building 
code”. [9]  
Other submitters responding to the Consultative document also criticised the excessive life 
safety standard applied to earthquake prone buildings.  
Smoking alone kills 20 times as many people each and every year as were killed in 
Christchurch. The total number of Kiwis killed by earthquake is one tenth of those killed 
by smoking and the same for obesity… [7, 12] 
2.3.2  Insurance and financial barriers 
Submitters responding to the original Consultation document documented concerns  about the lack 
of insurance for such URM buildings impacting on the ability to obtain bank finance to upgrade, 
assuming of course the loan-to-value ratios support a loan in the first place. Where in areas of low 
value and low rent they do not, as the case study in this and a previous paper by the writer suggest, 
financial support is required.  
2.4  The Heritage EQUIP funding source.  
The Auckland Council’s submission recognised the problems a lack of funding could result in and 
suggested to the Commission that “bank loans be guaranteed for owners needing to upgrade 
buildings and for the cost of a seismic retrofit (just that component) be deemed “repairs and 
maintenance” rather than capital expenditure for tax purposes [7]. 
A recent change in government policy has recently  resulted in revised regulations that address 
in a very limited form the concerns of Auckland Council and others. Owners of selected buildings 
are now able to make application to Heritage EQUIP for funding to “…give them more options to 
manage the unique earthquake strengthening challenges they face.” [10] This limited source of 
funding was instigated in 2016 as an incentive to supporting the refurbishment of New Zealand’s 
heritage building stock. The funding comes in the form of  grants for 1) professional advice and 2) 
grants to upgrade the works. 
2.4.1 Professional Advice Grants: 
These are limited only to eligible owners of Category 1 or Category 2 heritage buildings but only 
in regional centres that have a medium or high seismic risk, and for up to 50% of professional 
advice to a maximum of $50,000. The grants cover initial assessments costs such as professional 
engineering and architectural advice, geotechnical reports, conservation reports  and are designed 
to encourage professional input resulting in compliant-feasible solutions that are cost effective. 
(11) 
2.4.2. Work Upgrade Grants:  
Again, the grants apply only to eligible owners of Category 1 or Category 2 heritage buildings but 
covers this building type in all risk seismic centres. It covers up to 50% of the seismic strengthening 
cost and to a maximum of $400,000. Should the heritage building be location in a regional centre 
within a medium or high seismic zone, the percentage support has been recently increased, from 
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50% to 67% and can now be applied to buildings upgrading from their initial Earthquake-prone 
status to a structural level equivalent to 67% of the NBS. (11) 
3. A comparison: International Retrofit Strategies 
The seismic upgrading policies within other jurisdictions such Turkey, Japan and parts of the United 
States, in particular that of California, make an interesting comparison with those of New Zealand  
3.1 Turkey 
Interactions between the Anatolian plate and surrounding plates ensure earthquakes are by far the most 
significant natural hazard within this country (12). The risk is compounded by a rapid population 
growth, a history of illegal settlements and illegal structures and ongoing inertia on the part of the 
authorities to remedy the situation (13). The Van earthquake of 2011, suggest Gunes, was a “wake-up” 
call for concerted action. The passing of the Law No 6306, commonly referred to as the Urban 
Transformation Law, was implemented by Parliament within six months of the earthquake. Contrary to 
the very limited compensation available to effected building owners in New Zealand,  there is 
significant recompense for the effected owner or renter under this new Law in that, if high risk and 
within the selected high risk area undergoing seismic renewal and approved for demolition, the 
recipients of the effected structure are given credits that enable them to own/occupy an equivalent 
upgraded or new building within, or close to the area undergoing seismic regeneration (14).  The 
legislation is relatively new and whilst there are implementation problems, such as the lack of clarify 
surrounding the high risk designation processes they are, suggest Candas et al, faults within the  
implementation process that  can be remedied (13). There is no doubt, in spite of considerable teething 
problem,  the legislation is giving new impetus to the  very significant task of retrofitting or renewing 
the infrastructure within the high risk seismic  areas within the next 20 years 
3.2 California  
The Californian building legislation, referred to as the Uniform Building Code (UBC), contains only 
one passive “trigger” requiring a structural upgrade to a suspect building. That trigger is a change in 
use of a particular building, with discretion given to building compliance officers to determine if the 
change of use is to a more hazardous occupancy. Most cities within the area have however instigated 
additional regulations that reflect the communities concern over safety issues associated with existing 
buildings, especially those constructed in URM. For this reason, suggest Hoover, California continues 
“...to be a leader within the USA in the field of seismic mitigation” [15]. The active “triggers” require 
seismic retrofitting for certain building types, with the state mandating that the seismic hazards of 
unreinforced URM buildings in particular must be mitigated in a proactive manner, particularly in the 
area of parapet hazards, where the parapet upstand has often deteriorated and is not well secured to the 
structure. All regional building codes offer a standard for the seismic strengthening of URM buildings 
–viz. the Uniform Code for Building Conservation. The policy hence has similarities to the just passed 
legislation for URM buildings in New Zealand. Unlike New Zealand however, which is implementing 
a national policy with specific timeframes and retrofit requirements, there is within California a wide 
variation in the standards utilized within the different cities making up the Zone 4 earthquake area (the 
zone of highest risk). This is an unfortunate situation says Hoover, resulting in “...an uneven level of 
life safety between jurisdictions, unfair requirements of building owners, and inequitable economic 
competition between jurisdictions” [16]. There is a strong need, suggests Hoover, for “uniform life 
safety standards for the assessment and retrofitting of existing buildings” [16]. The New Zealand nation-
wide policy of seismic retrofitting regulations for earthquake-prone buildings would hence be seen by 
Hoover as a desirable outcome in the task of providing minimum life safety for building users in 
California.  
The issue of compulsory retrofit within a specific timeframe remains a challenge in California, just 
as it does in New Zealand. An example of this would be the issue of hospital seismic safety. The Senate 
Bill in 1994, which requires a specific time frame, comes up against the social consequences of 
demolition and closure for non-complying buildings not capable, through lack of funds, of meeting the 
requirement to “survive earthquakes without collapsing or posing a threat of significant loss of life.” In 
the case such as the hospital, where  continued use is essential, the recommendation is for public funding 
for genuine hardship, but with a recommendation “to encourage new construction over retrofitting” 
[19].  
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3.3 Japan 
Japan has of recent years subsequent to the Kobe earthquake revised its building code, moving to the 
adoption of a performance based document, similar to the nation-wide performance based code adopted 
by New Zealand in 1991 [17]. The hope is the introduction of this form of legislation will provide a 
greater degree of flexibility, innovation  and design freedom in the realm of material use in building 
construction. [18]. Seismic upgrading has traditionally be allocated a low priority in Japan. Although 
the damage and cost of the Kobe earthquake has change minds, an OECD report indicates up to 30% 
of Japan buildings remains constructed to outdated building codes and building standards. [1]. Whilst 
it may be a leader in seismic hazard mitigation technology for new construction, the performance based 
code does not provide for existing buildings, except when there may be additions to the building in 
question that involve changes to structural members. There is also, unlike California, no code 
requirement for building strengthening where a change of use  is proposed for a building, and unlike 
New Zealand, no compulsory requirement to strengthen or mitigate the hazards unreinforced (URM) 
buildings, with the decision to upgrade an optional one for the building owner. Should the owner decide 
to seismic strengthen, the seismic force level for which the upgrade is to be designed can be determined 
by the same owner[19]. Financial aid for seismic retrofit is available, with the supporting financial 
legislation introduced after the Kobe earthquake. [20]. Although the financial aid is modest, estimated 
between the range 13-16 percent, its presence along with other incentives such as reduced housing 
loans, taxation relief and reduced interest rates ensure widespread takeup. The monetary incentive is 
across all manner of buildings, unlike New Zealand, where financial loans are available to a restricted 
few buildings that rate a  high valued Category 1 or Category 2 heritage category. 
3.4 Comparison 
A summary of the variation between international legislation can be compared in broad terms by 
reference to the following Table 1 
Table 1. Seismic Strengthening Comparison 
Requirement New Zealand Turkey Japan California 
Upgrade 
compulsory? 
Yes – to 34% of 
NBS within 7-25yrs 
for high risk seismic 
zones  
Yes, within 
designated 
areas. 
No Yes, but to 
certain URM 
building types 
only 
Upgrade required-
change of use? 
Yes Yes Unknown Yes, but only if to 
a more hazardous 
use 
Upgrade required-
structural 
alterations  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial incentive Limited to selected 
Category 1, Category 
2 heritage buildings 
only. 
Yes, if within 
designated 
areas 
Yes, 13-16% Public funding for 
certain building 
types and if 
personal hardship 
4. Case Study Comparison:
Two further case study examples calculating the likely expenses for the retrofit of a typical small
scaled URM building are examined. The case studies builds on previous analysis that considered
rental returns for a North Island town and a South Island city, Dunedin [21]. As stated, the seismic
upgrade is necessary to ensure the earthquake prone URM building comes up to the required minimum
New Building Standard (NBS) of 34%, this being the new minimum allowable percentage  required by
the new legislation.. Costs are rated against rental values subsequent to any upgrade and the viability
of the resultant financial situation accessed. The building selected is located in the inner-city suburb of
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Mt Eden, a prosperous secondary rental location with a street heritage substantially effected by the 
legislation (Fig 3). The plan areas are typical of such buildings, with prime ground floor retail space of 
a limited size, ancillary spaces to the rear of the ground floor (storage) and the upper floor area, 
originally given over to “home shop” accommodation for the owner and family, but now predominantly 
used for a variety of activities, either related to the shop activity or sublet to other tenants. Values are 
estimates only and variations, depending upon location and condition, can be expected.  
Figure 3: Mt Eden URM Building 
 
4.1 Case Study 1: Mt. Eden, Auckland  
For the Auckland case study rental values were based on valuations for the building and other equivalent 
building valuations from similar areas. Summary values are indicated in Table 2. Building costs were 
derived from Contractor estimates. Auckland is a low risk earthquake zone. Strengthening is required 
within a 35year time frame.  
Table 2.  Building Strengthening Estimates –Auckland 
Location Area sm Rental Value $ Estimated Upgrade 
Cost Excl. Tax $ 
Ground floor   65.00 $700psm -  45,500  231,000 
Rear ancillary area   38.33 $258psm-     9,890    84,000 
First Floor   77.22 $175psm -  13,520  126,000 
Total ~180 sm ~$68,910.00 $441,000.00 
 
4.2. Case Study 2: Marton 
The region is renowned for its non-heritage and heritage structures and is designated a high-risk 
earthquake zone. As a result, any strengthening requirements are required within the 15year maximum 
time frame. Rental values have been estimated from real estate data for a regional town retail location 
and have been estimated in the region of $180-190 per square metre overall, depending upon location. 
Building rates are suggested as marginally cheaper than the Auckland rates, with savings to undertake 
the same amount of construction upgrade in the order of $50,000.00 
Table 3:  Building Strengthening Estimates -Marton 
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Location Area sm Rental Value $ Estimated Upgrade 
Cost Excl. Tax $ 
Ground floor   65.00 $340psm -$22,100 220,000 
Rear ancillary area   38.33 $125psm -    4,791   80,000 
First Floor   77.22 $100psm-       7,700 100,000 
Total ~180 sm $34,590.00 $400,000.00 
 
4.3. Findings  
The comparisons from the case study investigation can best be illustrated by reference to Table 4 below. 
Bank finance costs, interest only, at 5.6% is assumed across the total upgrade cost. An improved 
lease/rental ability factor of 10% is assumed subsequent to strengthening.  
 
Table 4. Cost breakdown summary analysis 
 
Item Auckland $ Marton $ 
Existing Rental   68,910 34,590 
LESS Bank Finance cost per 
annum (Interest only-5.6%) 
(24,700.00) 
[$441,000 x 5.6%] 
(22,400.00) 
[$400,000 x 5.6%] 
PLUS Improved lease ability 
(10%) 
   6,890  3,450 
Gross rental income pa 
after deduction of 
strengthening costs 
51,100.00 15,640.00 
Income LOSS due to 
strengthening pa.  
(17,810.00) ~26% (18,950.00) ~ 55% 
Estimated Gross Valuation 
loss.1 
(Estimated Capitilisation rate 
prior - after (%)) 
~21%2 
 
(7.5%-7%) 
~50% 
 
(10% - 9%) 
 
Rental income is gross excluding tax and assumes costs for rates and insurance is the responsibility 
of the tenant. Both locations suffer loss of income. The most extreme loss related to value situation 
remains the Martin example, with income reduced from an estimated gross income of $34,590 to an 
effective $15,640.00 p.a. after bank loan costs for strengthening are subtracted from gross income. For 
properties such as this, the final return of $15,640, and assuming a upgraded capitalisation rate of 9%, 
reduces the book value of the property from an original $345,900 to $173,770, a loss in valuation in the 
order of 50%. If per annum maintenance costs are included in the Martin example, say $4000.00, the 
effective nett rental profit before tax would be in the order of $11,640.00 p.a., a sum that equates to a 
return on the original investment of less than an equivalent bank term deposit rate.  
5.  CONCLUSIONS  
This case study outlines the challenges for the building owner of complying with the new legislation 
and still maintaining a viable business operation. In the town of Marton,  costs suggests the income loss 
(57%) and resultant nett income would render the retrofit and strengthening option marginal.  
Compounding this is the relatively short strengthening period as Martin, together with other towns in 
the region, such as Taihapi and Bulls, are within a high risk earthquake zone. The only other option to 
avoid paying the $200,000 fine for non-compliance is to demolish the building. Demolition for  these 
                                               
1 Valuation loss: (Est.V. Price prior = 68910/7.5 x 100) –(Est. V. Price after = 51100/7 x 100) 
2 Percentage loss = Est Valuation loss/Original Est Valuation prior x 100 
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non-heritage buildings seems the most likely course of action. To date, with the exception of minor 
government loan advances for parapet and veranda repairs to buildings in high earthquake zones 
requiring immediate repair, and the Heritage EQUIP funding for selected Cat 1 or Cat 2 Heritage quality 
buildings, the funding to support any substantial retrofit has not been forthcoming from the state.  
In the Auckland example, high rental values ensure this particular building remains financially the 
lesser effected by the legislation. In addition, the high value of land in similar inner city suburban 
locations within Auckland, such as Ponsonby and Devonport,  and the prospect of a greater building 
intensification under new zoning regulations could present an attractive alternative in favour of 
demolition/rebuild  over retrofit and strengthening, to the detriment of energy savings.  In other outer 
suburb and less wealthy fringe areas of Auckland however, such as Otahuhu or Papakura, the decision 
as to what direction to proceed is less clear, At stake for all suburgs is the quest to preserve the heritage 
streetscapes the presence of these small urban URM brick “home shop” these types of buildings 
currently achieve.  
Additional research is needed to develop and test alternative compliance processes, similar to 
the risk matrix assessment process used to determine cladding profiles and capable of being used, 
at least for low risk zones, by non-engineer professionals. The aim would be to secure these small-
scaled heritage building in such a way that fixes the most dangerous parts of a building and allows 
it to “fail safely” in a significant earthquake, but by the same token limits upgrading costs to levels 
where on-going occupation of these URM structures continues to be viable. If however, 
Government policy remains in its present form, and the lack of financial support for the non-
heritage building continues, mass demolition of street heritage will most likely happen. With that 
the appeal of a neighbourhood will be diminished, and with it the financial and community rewards 
associated with that same appeal. 
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